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7e Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).

The right to determine when and if to have children has long
been a subject for the courts, and "is at the very heart of...
constitutionally protected choices."' Case law, however, does
not always keep pace with developing science. Most all previous
decisions concerning the right to procreate have involved traditional reproductive relationships. The issue of protected rights
in surrogacy contracts came kicking and screaming into the
American consciousness in the form of a small baby girl dubbed
"Baby M." Nowhere has the need for courts and legislatures to
stay current with biomedical science been more dramatically
demonstrated than in the two years of turmoil which surrounded
Baby M's future.In February 1985, Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogate parenting contract with William Stern, agreeing to bear
his child through artificial insemination.' The contract stipulated
that Mr. Stern and his wife, Elizabeth, wanted a child but that she
I Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). In Carey, the
United States Supreme Court held that, absent a compelling state interest, a New
York law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors was unconstitutional. Id.
at 681-82. The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan,
reasoned:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child . . . holds a
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy ....
This is understandable, for in a field that by definition concerns the
most intimate of human activities and relationships, decisions whether
to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most private and
sensitive. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Id. at 685 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (concluding that Massachusetts law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons violates constitutional right to equal protection under
the laws)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state law prohibiting abortion violates the right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(state law prohibiting use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state law mandating sterilization of"habitual criminals" violates equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
2 See, e.g., No Other Hope for Having a Child, 109 NEWSWEEK 50 (Jan. 19, 1987);
Who Keeps 'Baby .1'?, 109 NEWSWEEK 44 Uan. 19, 1987); Whose Child is This?, 129
TIME 56, Jan. 19, 1987; Schneider, Mothers Urge Ban on Sw-rogacy as Form of 'Slavery',
N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987, at A13, col. 1.
3 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 410-11, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (1988).
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was infertile.4 It further provided that Mrs. Whitehead would
turn over the child to the Sterns upon delivery, taking whatever
steps necessary to terminate her parental rights so that Mrs.
Stern could adopt the child. 5 While Richard Whitehead, Mrs.
Whitehead's husband, was a party to the contract, Mrs. Stern was
not.' Mr. Whitehead promised to take all steps "necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity" pursuant to New Jersey's Parentage Act.7 The contract stipulated that Mrs. Stern would be
the child's sole custodian should Mr. Stern die before the birth.8
In addition, the agreement provided that Mr. Stern would cooperate with the artificial inseminations, and would pay $10,000 to
Mrs. Whitehead upon delivery of a child to him.'" After the con4 Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235. The Sterns met as University of Michigan graduate students and were married in 1974, after each had earned a Ph.D. In re Baby M,
217 N.J. Super. 313, 335, 525 A.2d 1128, 1138 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd
ii part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). Mr. Stern's parents were the sole
family survivors of the Holocaust and when they died, he "became the only surviving member of all branches in his family." 1d. While the couple had discussed the
possibility of having children early in their relationship, when Mrs. Stern began
medical school they decided to postpone a family until her pediatric residency was
completed. Id. at 336, 525 A.2d at 1138-39. At trial, it was disclosed that Mrs.
Stern had been diagnosed during her pediatric residency as having a mild form of
multiple sclerosis which she feared would be exacerbated by a pregnancy. Id., 525
A.2d at 1139. She was not infertile, as the contract stated. Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 411,
537 A.2d at 1235.
5 Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235. The contract's sole purpose was
"that 'of giving a child to William Stern, its natural and biological father.' " Id. at
423, 537 A.2d at 1241. The fee to be paid to Mrs. Whitehead was defined as "compensation for services and expenses and in no way . . . a fee for termination of
parental rights or a payment in exchange for consent to surrender a child for adoption." Id. at 423-24, 537 A.2d at 1241. The contract further stipulated that no fee
would be due should the child die prior to the fourth month of gestation, and the
Sterns were only liable for $ 1,000 if the child were to be stillborn. Id. at 424, 537
A.2d at 1241.
6 Id. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235. At the time of trial, the Whitehead finances were
in disarray as Mrs. Whitehead's sister was foreclosing on the Whitehead's second
mortgage on their home. Id. at 457, 537 A.2d at 1258. There was evidence that
Mr. Whitehead suffered from alcoholism. Id. After the trial court proceeding, but
before the New Jersey Supreme Court rendered its decision, Mrs. Whitehead conceived another man's child, divorced Richard and married the father of her unborn
child. Id. at 461 n.18, 537 A.2d at 1260 n.18.
7 Id. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-43(a)(1), -44(a)
(West Supp. 1987)). The Parentage Act provides in pertinent part:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if ... [hie and
the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the mar-

riage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
8 Baby 11, 109 NJ. at 412, 424, 537 A.2d at 1235, 1241.
- Id. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235.
In a separate agreement, Mr. Stern also promised to pay the Infertility Clinic of
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tract was signed, several artificial inseminations were performed."' Mrs. Whitehead conceived, and on March 27, 1986,
gave birth to Baby M. "
Wanting to keep the surrogacy agreement private, the
Whiteheads appeared to all at the hospital as the proud parents. 12- The birth certificate listed the baby's name as Sara Elizabeth Whitehead, and Richard Whitehead was designated her
father.'13 To respect Mrs. Whitehead's request that their arrangement remain secret, "the Sterns visited the hospital unobtrusively to see the newborn child."' 4 During one visit, the Sterns
told Mrs. Whitehead that they had decided to name the baby
"Melissa."' 5 Upon hearing the name, Mrs. Whitehead broke into
tears and questioned whether she could part with her child. 6
She spoke of how the baby resembled her older daughter,' 7 and
indicated that her prior agreement to relinquish custody of the
baby was causing her great difficulty.'
Mrs. Whitehead turned over the infant to the Sterns on
March 30, 1986, during a meeting at the Whitehead home.' For
the Sterns, this "was a time ofjoyful celebration" and the culmiNew York (ICNY) $7,500. Id. ICNY actively solicited potential surrogate mothers
and matched them with infertile couples. Id. Both Mrs. Whitehead and the Sterns
had been drawn to ICNY by its newspaper advertisements. Id. at 413, 537 A.2d at
1236. The Sterns had considered and rejected adoption because of the long delay
involved and because of their age and differing religious backgrounds which they
perceived to be stumbling blocks to adoption approval. Id. Mrs. Whitehead came
to ICNY for monetary rewards and "to give another couple the 'gift of life.' " Id.
She had been involved in an unsuccessful attempt to conceive for another couple
through ICNY before being introduced to the Sterns. Id. at 414, 537 A.2d at 1236.
Prior to being matched, ICNY had arranged for a routine psychological examination of Mrs. Whitehead to evaluate her suitability to be a surrogate. Baby M1,217
N.J. Super. at 343, 525 A.2d at 1142. Although the examiner expressed concern
over her ability to actually part with a child after birth, she was recommended for
the program. Id. Neither the Sterns nor the Whiteheads were told of the evaluator's reservations. Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
Io Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 414, 537 A.2d at 1236.
I ]d. Mrs. Whitehead's pregnancy was "uneventful." Id.
12

Id.

13 Id.
14 Id.
'5 Id. at 414-15, 537 A.2d at 1236.
16 Id. at 414, 537 A.2d at 1236.
17 Id. The Whiteheads have a son and a daughter, Ryan and Tuesday. Baby M,
217 N.J. Super. at 339, 525 A.2d at 1140. At the time of Baby M's birth, the
children were ages I I and 10, respectively. Id. After Tuesday's birth, the Whiteheads agreed that Mr. Whitehead would have a vasectomy to preclude further
pregnancies. Id.
18 Baby Al, 109 N.J. at 414, 537 A.2d at 1236.
'!) Id. at 414-15, 537 A.2d at 1236.
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nation of endless planning for the baby's arrival in their lives. 2
They looked forward to the years of watching the baby they
called "Melissa" grow. 2 ' While aware of Mrs. Whitehead's emotional turmoil, they did not fully realize its depth or its
implications.-"
Within hours of giving up the baby, "Mrs. Whitehead became deeply disturbed, disconsolate, [and] stricken with unbearable sadness" over the loss of her child. -' She was unable to
sleep or eat, and thought of nothing but the absent baby. 24 The
following day, Mrs. Whitehead visited the Sterns and told them
of her anguish. z5 Surprised and frightened by her reaction and
fearing a suicide attempt, they agreed to return the baby to her
for one week. 2" The Sterns would not have the baby in their
home again for four months.2 7
After realizing that Mrs. Whitehead had no intention of returning the child, Mr. Stern filed a complaint for enforcement of
the surrogacy contract; custody of the child; termination of Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights; restraint on any interference with
custody; and approval of the baby's adoption by Mrs. Stern. 8
The complaint alleged that Mrs. Whitehead had breached the
contract and had threatened to take the baby out of the state in
order to avoid legal intervention. -t It further alleged that Mrs.
Whitehead, if given prior notice of the application for an order of
custody, would leave the state prior to a hearing."') An ex parte
20

Id. at 415, 537 A.2d at 1236.

21 Id.
22

Id.

Id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id., 537 A.2d at 1236-37.
27 Id., 537 A.2d at 1237.
28 Id. at 415, 4 17, 537 A.2d at 1237. Mrs. Whitehead telephoned the Sterns on
April 1,1986, to inform them that she was visiting relatives and would be unreachable. BabY .l,217 N.J. Super. at 348, 525 A.2d at 1145. Mrs. Whitehead had taken
the five-day-old infant to her parents' home in Florida. 1I. Nine days later she
returned to New jersey and told the Sterns she would return the baby to them on
April 12. Id. at 349, 525 A.2d at 1145. By April 12, Mrs. Whitehead had changed
her mind, but permitted the Sterns to visit the child. Id. During the visit, she announced her decision to keep the child and threatened to leave the country if faced
with legal action. Id. She refused to let Mr.Stern "hold the baby one more time,"
and threatened to call the police if the Sterns did not leave. Id. On April 20, 1986,
the Whiteheads put their home up for sale, "indicating in the listing that they might
be relocating to Florida." Id.
29 Baby Al, 109 N.J. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1237.
3(0 Id. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
23
24
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order was granted, and a process server, the police and the
Sterns went to the Whitehead home to execute the order.3 '
While Mrs. Whitehead argued with the group over the baby's
proper name, the baby was handed through an open window to
Mr. Whitehead and he fled.3
3
The Whiteheads immediately went to Florida with Baby M. 1
Thereafter, Mrs. Whitehead called the Sterns on several occasions to discuss the situation. Mr. Stern recorded the conversations which revealed "an escalating dispute about rights, morality
and power;" Mrs. Whitehead also threatened to kill herself and
the child, and falsely accused Mr. Stern of molesting her other
4
daughter. 3
Ultimately, the Sterns discovered the Whiteheads' location
and obtained a Florida court order requiring the return of the
child. 5 Florida police enforced the order, forcibly taking Baby M
from her grandparents' home and returning her to the Sterns."'
The prior ex parte order of custody for the Sterns pendente lite
was reaffirmed on the trial court's consideration of certified representations of both parties. 7 Pending a final decision, Mrs.
Whitehead was allowed limited visitation with the child,3 8 and a
guardian ad litem was appointed. '
In response to the Sterns' suit, the Whiteheads filed a counterclaim for custody of the child and damages for fraud. 4 " Based
on traditional contract analysis, they alleged that the contract was
one of adhesion and unconscionability, and was illusory. 4 ' They
also argued that the surrogacy agreement was void because it left
the child unprotected; that it violated public policy concerns by
'i I Id.
42 Id.
33 Id. The family initially staved with Mrs. Whitehead's parents. Id. During the

following three months, to avoid apprehension, they lived in some twenty different
locations. Id.
34

Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.

Id.
Id. at 416-17, 537 A.2d at 1237.
3 See id. at 420, 537 A.2d at 1239. The guardian ad litem was appointed to protect Baby M's best interests. Id. at 420-21, 537 A.2d at 1239.
40 Baby .11, 217 N.J. Super. at 329, 525 A.2d at 1135. The misrepresentations
and omissions which constituted the basis for the allegation of fraud included: Mrs.
Stern was not infertile; the Whiteheads were never informed that Mrs. Stern had
multiple sclerosis; and Mrs. Whitehead was never told the results of her psychological examination. Id. at 379, 525 A.2d at 1161.
41 Id. at 376, 384, 525 A.2d at 1159, 1163.
37
38
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exploiting women, denigrating human dignity by producing children for money, undermining the traditional family unit, and creating an elite economic group which would use the poor to
achieve their purposes; and that it violated state adoption and
other child benefit laws. 42
Attrial, Superior CourtJudge Harvey Sorkow upheld the validity of the surrogate contract, terminated Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights and visitation, granted sole custody to Mr. Stern;
and allowed Mrs. Stern to adopt the baby.4 3 Judge Sorkow reasoned that since the various state statutes involved did not specifically address surrogacy contracts, they were inapplicable.44
After analyzing the individual interests involved and the court's
authority, Judge Sorkow held that while such contracts were
valid, specific performance could be granted only on a finding
that placement with the father was in the best interest of the
that the best interests of Baby M
child.4 The judge concluded
46
dictated such a finding.
Mrs. Whitehead appealed and the New Jersey Supreme
Court granted direct certification. 47 The supreme court reagreement requiring compensaversed, holding that a surrogacy
tion was illegal and invalid. 48 The court also decided that it was
in Baby M's best interests for Mr. Stern to retain custody.49
Thus, the court voided both the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's
parental rights and the adoption by Mrs. Stern, and remanded
the matter for a determination concerning Mrs. Whitehead's
visitation.:,(
This case, challenging the enforceability of a surrogacy contract, presented a novel issue for New Jersey courts" l and the na42

Id. at 371, 525 A.2d at 1157.

43 Baby .A, 109 N.J. at 417, 537 A.2d at 1237-38.
44 Id. at 418, 537 A.2d at 1238 (citing In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 372-73,

525 A.2d 1128, 1157-58 (Ch. Div. 1987)).
4.5 Id.

Id. at 417-18, 537 A.2d at 1238.
Id. at 419, 537 A.2d at 1238 (citing In re Baby M, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203
(1987)).
48 Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234-35.
41) Id., 537 A.2d at 1234.
50 Id., 537 A.2d at 1234-35.
51 Baby 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 375, 389, 525 A.2d at 1159, 1166. The trial court
noted that "there is no law governing surrogacy contracts in New Jersey and the
laws of adoption do not apply to surrogacy contracts." Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at
1159. The court also observed that New Jersey had no stated public policy concerning surrogacy. Id. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
41

47
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tion. 2 While there have been other occasions where surrogate
mothers have insisted on revocation of surrogacy agreements,
these matters were settled out of court with the mothers retaining custody.
Three states, however, had previously addressed
how their adoption statutes related to surrogacy.5 4
In Doe v. Kelley, 5 5 the Michigan Court of Appeals considered
whether the state adoption code prohibiting an exchange of consideration in conjunction with an adoption applied to surrogacy
agreements." In Doe, a married couple brought suit alleging that
sections of the state adoption code were unconstitutional infringements on their right to privacy in having a child. 57 The
court held that a surrogacy contract, which seeks to modify the
legal status of a child, namely "its right to support, intestate succession, etc.," is not "within the realm of the fundamental interests protected by the right to privacy.""S While the court
52

Sherman, N.J. High Court Faces Solomonic Baby MV Choice, The Nat'l L.J., Sept.

28, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
524Taub, Amincus Brief.- In the Matter of Baby .1, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9
(1987) (citing Galen, Suriogate Law, The Nat'l L.J., Sept. 9, 1986, at 10, col. 2).
54 See infra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
.5 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983).
56 See id. at 170-72, 307 N.W.2d at 439-40.
57 Id. at 172, 307 N.W.2d at 440. The Michigan statute in question provides:
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall
not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of
value in connection with any of the following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the existence of
a child available for adoption or the existence of a person interested in
adopting a child.
(c) A release.
(d) A consent.
(e) A petition.
(2)

Before the entry of the final order of adoption, the petitioner shall

file with the court a sworn statement describing money or other consideration or thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in the adoption proceeding, including anyone consenting to the adoption or
adopting the adoptee, any relative of a party or of the adoptee, any physician, attorney, social worker or member of the clergy, and any other
person, corporation, association, or other organization. The court shall
approve or disapprove fees and expenses. Acceptance or retention of
amounts in excess of those approved by the court constitutes a violation
of this section.
MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 710.54 (1979). In addition, a related Michigan statute provides that -[a] person who violates any of the provisions of section[I .

.

.54 of this

chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent conviction shall be guilty of a felony." MicH. CoMp. LAWS § 710.69 (1979).
58 106 Mich. App. 169 at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
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observed that the decision to have a child was a constitutionally
protected interest,M it reasoned that interest was not compromised by the adoption code as the code did not preclude a
couple from engaging a surrogate mother, but only from paying
6
her. 0
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached an opposite conclusion in Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong."' In that case the Kentucky Attorney
General sued Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. (SPA), seeking
revocation of its corporate charter and alleging that its surrogate
parenting procedure violated state adoption laws."' SPA operated a clinic which, like the Infertility Clinic of New York
(ICNY)," assisted in matching infertile couples to surrogate
mothers."4 The typical contract between the surrogate and the
biological father called for termination of the surrogate mother's
parental rights after delivery, for payment of a fee to both the
mother and SPA, and for custody to be vested in the biological
father."5 It further provided that the surrogate's husband agreed
to relinquish his claim to the child."" The court rejected the attorney general's argument that because the adoption code specif-59 Id. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 440-41 (citations omitted). The court stated:
While the decision to bear or beget a child has thus been found to
be a fundamental interest protected by the right of privacy, see illaher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1977), we do not
view this right as a valid prohibition to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual arrangement. The statute in question does not directly
prohibit John Doe and Mary Roe from having the child as planned. It
acts instead to preclude plaintiffs from paying consideration in conjunction with their use of the state's adoption procedures. In effect, the
plaintiffs' contractual agreement discloses a desire to use the adoption
code to change the legal status of the child-i.e., its right to support,
intestate succession, etc. We do not perceive this goal as within the
realm of fundamental interests protected by the right to privacy from
reasonable governmental regulation.
Id.
60" Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
6l 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
62 Id. at 210. The relevant statutes prohibited the purchase, sale or procurement for purchase or sale of a child for adoption purposes or the filing of a petition
seeking voluntary relinquishment of parental rights within five days after a child's
birth, and invalidated consent for adoption given within five days after a child's
birth. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.500(5) (Baldwin 1984) (amended July I, 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.601(2) (Baldwin 1984) (repealedJuly I, 1987).
ii- See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64 Sumogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 210.
65 Id.
"i Id. at 210-11.
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ically referred to in vitro fertilization without mentioning
surrogacy, the legislature, by its silence, prohibited surrogate
parenting."' The court determined that the Kentucky legislature
"intended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming an expectant
mother or the parents of a child with financial inducements to
part with the child." ' .. Concluding that surrogacy agreements
are entered into before a child is conceived,"" the court held that
such contracts were outside the purview of the adoption code
and not in violation of other state law. 7" In dicta, however, the
court observed that under Kentucky law a surrogate mother can
revoke her contractual consent to relinquishment of parental
(7 Id. at 212. The attorney general relied on the following statutory provision,
contained in a section captioned "Advertisement soliciting children for adoption
prohibited-Charging fees prohibited-Sale or purchase of children prohibitedIn vitro fertilization not prohibited by this section-Adoption fees including attorney's fees must be approved by court:"
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit in vitro fertilization. For purposes of this section 'in vitro fertilization' means the process whereby an egg is removed from a woman, then fertilized in a
receptacle by the sperm of the husband of the woman in whose womb
the fertilized egg will thereafter be implanted.
See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212 (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.590(2) (Baldwin 1984)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1984). In
rejecting this assertion, the Kentucky court reasoned:
The Attorney General contends that by including this "in vitro" fertilization procedure in the statute while leaving out the surrogate
parenting procedure presently under consideration, the legislature was
legislating against surrogate parenting. We do not divine any such hidden meanings. All we can derive from this language is that the legislature has expressed itself about one procedure for medically assisted
conception while remaining silent on others. To this extent the legislature puts its stamp of approval on tampering with nature in the interest
of' assisting a childless couple to conceive. The "in vitro" fertilization
procedure sanctioned by the statute and the surrogate parenting procedure as described in the Stipulation of Facts are similar in that both
enable a childless couple to have a baby biologically related to one of
them when they could not do so otherwise. The fact that the statute
now expressly sanctions one way of doing this does not rule out other
ways by implication. In an area so fundamental as medically assisting a
childless couple to have a child, such a prohibition should not be
implied.

Surrogate ParentingAssocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212.
68 Sunogate ParentingAssocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211. "[T]he central fact in the surro-

gate parenting procedure is that the agreement is entered into before conception."
Id.
(i9 Id. The court asserted that the issue of whether surrogate parenting offends

public policy and therefore should be prohibited is a determination which must be
made by the legislature, not the courts. Id. at 213. As current legislation did not
foreclose surrogate agreements, the court refused to intervene. Id. at 214.
70 Id.
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7
rights and custody up to five days after giving birth. 1
New York was the third state to consider the relationship between surrogate contracts and state law in In re Adoption of Baby
Girl L.J. ,72 in which the litigants asked the court to approve adoption of a baby born as the result of a contractual arrangement
between the biological father and a surrogate mother.73 The
contract, prepared by an attorney who represented the. father,
called for payment of $10,000 to the mother and $3,500 to the
attorney.7 ' The New York court determined that "such arrangements are not void, but are voidable because the individual
State's adoption statutes, which are designed to safeguard the
best interests of the child, take precedence over any agreement
between the parties." 75 Concluding that New York laws did not
"expressly foreclose" parenting agreements, the court approved
both the adoption of the baby by the wife of the biological father
and payment to the surrogate mother as well as payment of her

71

Id. at 2 13. The court asserted:
SPA has freely acknowledged that the initial contractual arrangements regarding the mother's surrender of custody and termination of
parental rights are voidable. The surrogate mother's consent given
before five days following birth of the baby is no more legally binding
than the decision of an unwed mother during her pregnancy that she
will put her baby up for adoption. The five days' consent feature in the
termination of parental rights statute... and in the consent to adoption
statute ...

take precedence over the parties' contractual commitments,

meaning that the surrogate mother is free to change her mind. The policy of the voluntary termination statute and the consent to adoption statute is to preserve to the mother her right of choice regardless of
decisions made before the birth of the child. This policy is not violated
by the existence of the contractual arrangements previously made. The
policy of these statutes is carried out because the law gives the mother
the opportunity to reconsider her decision to fulfill the role as surrogate
mother and refuse to perform the voluntary termination procedure.
Should she elect to do so, the situation would be no different than had
she never entered into the procedure. She would be in the same position vis-a-vis the child and the biological father as any other mother with
a child born out of wedlock. The parental rights and obligations between the biological father and mother, and the obligations they owe to
the child, would then be the rights and obligations imposed by pertinent
statutes rather than the obligations imposed by the contract now
vitiated.
Id. at 212-13. See supra note 62 for pertinent text of statute.
72 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. 1986).
73 Id. at 972-73, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
74 Id. at 973, 975, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 814, 818.
75 Id. at 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The court observed that "[i]f violations of the
adoption statutes are found in the terms of the parenting agreement, the court may
find the contract illegal and deny the petition for adoption." Id.
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attorney's fees.7" The court, however, expressed its "strong reservations about these arrangements both on moral and ethical
grounds, ' 77 and commended the issue to the legislature's attention for appropriate action.7 8
Against this sparse decisional background, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rendered its decision in In re Baby M. 7 9 In a
unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Wilentz, the
supreme court held that parenting agreements which compensate the surrogate mother violate the law and public policy of
New Jersey. ° In so doing, the court rejected the argument that
such compensation is for the mother's services and not for the
right to adopt the baby, 8 1 and opined that such arrangements will
be validated only where a woman voluntarily acts as a surrogate
without compensation and not pursuant to a binding agreement
to surrender the child.8 The court noted that its decision in no
way precluded future legislative action to permit surrogacy
contracts.'
ChiefJustice Wilentz began his analysis with a detailed comparison of the surrogacy contract and New Jersey adoption statutes.8 4 Citing statutory law which prohibits the exchange of
76 Id. at 974, 978-79, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815, 818.

Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18. The court stated:
[T]he court requests the Legislature to review this serious problem in
order to determine whether statutory provisions should be made to allow or disallow the payments requested herein and the practice of surrogate parenting. Accordingly, copies of this decision have been sent to
the Law Revision Commission and the chairmen of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and Assembly.
Id., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
78 Id., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
79' 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
80 Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234. ChiefJustice Wilentz wrote: "While we recognize the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to have their own children, we
find the payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and
potentially degrading to women." Id.
81 Id. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240. The court stated: "We have no doubt whatsoever that the money is being paid to obtain an adoption and not, as the Sterns
argue, for the personal services of Mary Beth Whitehead." Id.
82 Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234. The court opined that the public policy and laws
of the state would not be offended if a woman decided to be a surrogate mother, as
long as she was neither compensated nor contractually bound to surrender her
baby. Id., 537 A.2d at 1235.
83 Id. The court observed: "[0ur holding today does not preclude the Legislature from altering the current statutory scheme, within constitutional limits, so as
to permit surrogacy contracts." Id.
84 Id. at 423-34, 537 A.2d at 1240-46.
77
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money in connection with adoptions115 except by state-approved,
non-profit agencies,"' the Baby M court characterized the surrogacy contract as an "illegal and perhaps criminal" attempt to
circumvent the statute.17 Rejecting the Sterns' argument that the
payments to Mrs. Whitehead and the infertility clinic that assisted
in this venture" were solely for services, the court found that the
money was "paid and accepted in connection with an adoption." '
The court then turned to the issue of Mrs. Whitehead's
agreement to relinquish parental rights.' ° The court explained
that because of the finality of termination of parental rights, New
85 Id. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp.
1987)). The New Jersey Parentage Act provides in pertinent part:
a. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or
agency shall make, offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in connection therewith
(1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable consideration, or assume or discharge any financial obligation; or
(2) Take, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any valuable consideration.
b. The prohibition of subsection a. shall not apply to the fees or
services of any approved agency in connection with a placement for
adoption, nor shall such prohibition apply to the payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital or other similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness of the child, or to the acceptance of
such reimbursement by a parent of the child.

c. Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or
agency violating this section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1987).
841 "Approved agency" is defined as "a nonprofit corporation, association or
agency, including any public agency, approved by the Department of Human Services for the purpose of placing children for adoption in New Jersey." N.J. STAT.
3
ANN. § 9:3- 8(a) (West Supp. 1987).
87 Baby 1, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
88 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the infertility
clinic).
89 Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the contract's fee stipulations). The court emphasized the
various fee arrangements in the contract, which were dependent on whether the
child was carried to term and born healthy. Baby 11, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at
124 1. The court also stressed that contracting for such fees is a high misdemeanor
under New Jersey law, which is punishable by imprisonment for three to five years.
Id. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(c) (West Supp. 1987);
NJ. SWAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-1(b), -6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987)). See also supra note 85.
The court noted that the statutory prohibition is strong because of "[t]he evils inherent in baby bartering," id. (citing N. BAKER, BABY SELLING: THE SCANDAL OF
Bt.ACK MARKET ADOt-rION 7 (1979)), and because "It]he negative consequences of
baby buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential lor placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest of the child or
the natural mother." Id., 537 A.2d at 1242.
90 Baby Al, 109 N.J. at 425-29, 537 A.2d at 1242-44.
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Jersey statutory requirements concerning termination are stringently applied, and permit termination only in specific enumerated instances:'
in an action by an approved agency,92 in an
action by the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), 93 or
in a private placement adoption.9 4 The court determined that all
relevant statutes and case law mandate that where there is no voluntary, written surrender to DYFS or to an approved agency, termination of parental rights in the context of a private-placement
adoption would be granted only on a substantial showing of ne91 Id. at 426, 537 A.2d at 1242. The supreme court stated:

Our law, recognizing the finality of any termination of parental rights,
provides for such termination only where there has been a voluntary
surrender of a child to an approved agency or to the Division of Youth
and Family Services ("DYFS"), accompanied by a formal document acknowledging termination of parental rights, or where there has been a
showing of parental abandonment or unfitness.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-16, -17 (West 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41
(West Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-23 (West 1981)).
,92 Id. The court pointed out that termination by an approved agency could proceed only upon proof of a parent's written surrender of a child, forsaken parental
obligation, death or insanity. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-16, -17, -19 (West
1976)). Without parental consent, the court noted that there must also be proof of
"willful and continuous neglect or failure to perform the natural and regular obligations of care and support of a child." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-13(d)
(West 1976)).
93 Id. The court observed that absent formal surrender or written consent to
termination, DYFS may only seek to terminate parental rights upon a showing "that
the best interests of such child require that he be placed under proper guardianship." Id. at 426-27, 537 A.2d at 1242 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-20 , -23
(West 1976)). The court also stressed that the threshold for the best-interests test
for termination of parental rights far exceeds the custodial best-interest standard.
See id. at 427, 537 A.2d at 1242. According to the court, DYFS
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that "[tihe child's health
and development have been or will be seriously impaired by the parental relationship," that "[t]he parents are unable or unwilling to eliminate
the harm and delaying permanent placement will add to the harm," that
"[tihe court has considered alternatives to termination," and that "[tihe
termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good."
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the court posited that in a termination of parental
rights case there must be "a most substantial showing of harm to the child." Id.
,14Id. The court asserted that "there must be a finding of 'intentional abandonment or a very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that conduct in the future' " for judicial approval of the
termination of a natural parent's rights in a private-placement adoption. Id.(quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987)). The court, noting that it had
previously distinguished requirements for termination in private-placement adoptions and requirements for approved agency adoptions, reiterated its prior determination that in private placement, while neither voluntary surrender nor consent is a
statutory consideration, there can be no termination absent evidence of forsaken
parental obligations. Id. at 427-28, 537 A.2d at 1243 (citing Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J.
201, 213, 377 A.2d 628, 634 (1977)).
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glect or abandonment."' The Baby M court rejected the Sterns'
contention that such a showing was unnecessary where the petitioner, Mrs. Stern, was a stepparent96 The court also declined to
accept the Sterns' argument that the Parentage Act empowered
the trial court to terminate Mrs. Whitehead's rights based solely
on the child's best interests. 9 7 Finding that the legislature's carefully crafted termination statutes demonstrated intent not "to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in a
contract," Chief Justice Wilentz held the contract clause unenforceable."' He further ruled that because termination of Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights was improper, the adoption by Mrs.
Stern was invalid2'
The court then noted the lack of a contractual provision allowing Mrs. Whitehead to revoke her consent to termination of
her parental rights and relinquishment of custody. I" ° The court
observed that the state statutes only provide for irrevocable consent in narrowly prescribed circumstances involving surrender to
DYFS or an approved agency,' 0 ' and that consent may be re95

Id. at 428, 537 A.2d at 1243 (citations omitted).

9(i Id.

Id. at 429 n.6, 537 A.2d at 1243 n.6. The New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.
§§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West Supp. 1987), deals with situations where the
parentage of a child is in dispute. The Parentage Act provides in pertinent part:
The judgment or order may contain any other provision directed
against the appropriate party to the proceeding concerning the duty of
support, the custody and guardianship of the child, visitation privileges
with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment
of the judgment, the repayment of any public assistance grant, or any
other matter in the best interests of the child.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-53(c) (West Supp. 1987). The court reasoned that termination of parental rights differed from the areas to which the Parentage Act was directed. Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 429 n.6, 537 A.2d at 1243 n.6. The court also opined
that had the New Jersey Legislature intended such a major shift in the standards
97

STAT. ANN.

governing termination, it would have stated so expressly. Id.
91 Id. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1243-44. The court stated:
In this case a termination of parental rights was obtained not by
proving the statutory prerequisites but by claiming the benefit of contractual provisions. From all that has been stated above, it is clear that a
contractual agreement to abandon one's parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in our courts. The Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially
restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract.
Id.
!)!) Id.
100 Id. at 429-34, 537 A.2d at 1244-46.
Il Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246. The court asserted that -[t]here is only one
irrevocable consent, and that is the one explicitly provided for by statute: a consent
to surrender of custody and a placement with an approved agency or with DYFS."
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voked in private-placement adoptions. " " Thus, the court held
that the irrevocable nature of the contract was "one more indication of the essential nature of this transaction: the creation of a
contractual system of termination and adoption designed to circumvent our statutes. ' "
The court next considered public policy issues. 104 Asserting
that it was against settled law, the court repudiated what it characterized as "the contract's basic premise" - that parents can
make a pre-birth decision as to custody." °5 The court also found
the contract contrary to the New Jersey policy that children,
whenever possible, remain with and be raised by both natural
parents."' The court posited that the surrogacy contract violated the state's policy that natural parents have an equal right to
a relationship with the child, as the surrogacy contract's sole purpose was to give Mr. Stern, the father, the exclusive right to Baby
Id. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutory requirements concerning termination of parental rights.
102 See Baby ,1/, 109 N.J. at 433-34, 537 A.2d at 1245-46. With regard to revocability of consent, the court referred to its holding in Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 377
A.2d 628 (1977). Baby 4, 109 N.J. at 433, 537 A.2d at 1246. In Sees, a mother
changed her mind about surrendering custody in a private adoption two days after
giving her newborn infant to adoptive parents. Sees, 74 N.J. at 204, 377 A.2d at
630. The supreme court held that despite a knowing consent, the natural mother
had the right to revoke consent in a private-placement adoption and was entitled to
the return of the child even though a year had passed since he had been given to his
adoptive parents. Id. at 220, 225-26, 377 A.2d at 638, 641. The court determined
that "since there is no statutory obligation to consent [in a private-placement adoption], there can be no legal barrier to its retraction." Id. at 215, 377 A.2d at 635.
Consent was significant only as to whether the child had been abandoned or
whether there had been a forsaking of parental obligations. Id. at 213, 220, 377
A.2d at 634, 638.
1'l Baby M, 109 N.J. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
104 ld. at 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1246-50.
105 Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246 (citing Fantomy v. Fantomy, 21 N.J. 525, 536-37,
122 A.2d 593, 598 (1956); Sheenan v. Sheenan, 38 N.J. Super. 120, 125, 118 A.2d
89, 92 (App. Div. 1955) (stating that "[w]hatever the agreement of the parents, the
ultimate determination of custody lies with the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction as parens patiiae")). The court observed that "[tihe fact that the
trial court remedied that aspect of the contract through the 'best-interests' phase
does not make the contractual provision any less offensive to the public policy of
this state." Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1246.
0i6 Id., 537 A.2d at 1246-47. In making this determination the court relied upon
the stated purpose of the prior adoption act, which declared "it is necessary and
desirable .. .to protect the child from unnecessary separation from his natural
parents." Id., 537 A.2d at 1247 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-17 (West 1976) (repealed 1977)). While it noted that this purpose is not explicitly stated in the present statutes, the court posited that "this purpose remains part of the public policy
of this State." Id. (citations omitted). The Baby Al court pointed to the traumatic
circumstances surrounding the breakdown of the surrogacy agreement at bar as
proof of the need for such a policy. Id. at 435 n.9, 537 A.2d at 1247 n.9.
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7
M by terminating the rights of Mrs. Whitehead, the mother. 10
The court also determined that the surrogacy contract contravenes various statutory policies in that there was no knowing and
voluntary waiver of parental rights by Mrs. Whitehead,' 8 the
Sterns' interests were not fully served,"' the child's best interests
The ChiefJuswere disregarded,') and, it was baby selling.'
107 Id. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1247. The court relied on the Parentage Act which
stipulates that "[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every child
and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. (quoting
N.J. STAr. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West Supp. 1987)). The court also pointed to the Parentage Act's prefatory statement by the Assembly Judiciary Committee that "regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children and all parents have equal
rights with respect to each other." Id. at 436, 537 A.2d at 1247 (quoting ASSEMBLY
JUDICIARY, LAW, PUBLIC SAFETY & DEFENSE COMM. STATEMENT to Senate No. 888,
1983, c. 17, 200th Leg., 2d Sess. (1983)).
1o
Id. at 436-37, 537 A.2d at 1247-48. The court emphasized:
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed
before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing
contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of
a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary. Her interests are of
little concern to those who controlled this transaction.
Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
The court also criticized the sufficiency of the legal advice given to Mrs. Whitehead, particularly because the attorney she retained was referred by and under
agreement with ICNY to act as counsel to all surrogate candidates. Id. at 436, 537
A.2d at 1247. The court disapprovingly noted ICNY's failure to disclose the results
of Mrs. Whitehead's psychological examination to her or to the Sterns. Id. at 437,
537 A.2d at 1247. [he Chief Justice asserted that ICNY's failure to warn either
party of Mrs. Whitehead's potential inability to surrender the child was motivated
by greed. Id., 537 A.2d at 1247-48. Such a disclosure, the court observed, might
have prevented the ensuing years of trauma. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing Mrs. Whitehead's psychological evaluation).
109 Baby I, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248. The court observed that while
only the Sterns' interests were served by the contract, even the Sterns were not
sufficiently protected to the extent public policy requires. Id. The Sterns were not
aware of the natural mother's "genetic makeup," her psychological and medical
history, nor their parental responsibilities. Id.
1 i0 Id. Tlhe court posited that the child's best interests were totally disregarded
as the contract failed to consider the Sterns' fitness as the custodial parents, Mrs.
Stern's fitness as an adoptive mother, whether the Sterns were better suited than
Mrs. Whitehead to care for the child, and the effect upon the baby of separation
from its natural mother. Id.
III Id. at 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1248. The supreme court explored the asserted
differences between surrogacy and adoption, and rejected the contention that surrogacy agreements involving monetary compensation do not pose the same risks as
the use of money to secure an adoption. Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248-49. The
court observed that, unlike adoption. surrogacy arrangements would not exist without payment; that surrogacy is attributable to the use of money, while adoption is
not; that in surrogacy, unlike adoption, a mother is drawn to "the highest paying ill-
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tice concluded that although surrogacy's long-term effects on all
involved are unknown, they are potentially devastating.' 12 Thus,
for policy reasons the court determined that a surrogate's agreement to sell her baby is void because "lilts irrevocability infects
the entire contract as does the money that purports to buy it.' '1
After deciding that relinquishment of parental rights cannot
be contractually based, the court considered existing statutory
justifications for termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental
rights.'" The court reasoned that as there was no showing of
intentional abandonment, substantial neglect or unfitness, the
statutory standards for termination had not been met."' To the
contrary, the trial court had expressly found Mrs. Whitehead to
be a fit mother.""
suited adoptive parents," rather than an approved agency; and, that while in a private-placement adoption a mother's consent to surrender all rights to her child is
revocable, in surrogacy it is irrevocable and given so early in the transaction that it
could never be a fully informed decision. Id. at 438-39, 537 A.2d at 1248. The
court noted that while the initial inclination is to be more sympathetic to the woman carrying an unwanted pregnancy than to a surrogate who intentionally became
pregnant, further reflection reveals that the "essential evil" is identical-taking advantage of the circumstances (a need for money or unwanted pregnancy) in order
to deprive a woman of her child. Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1248-49. The court further asserted that the profit motive inherent in surrogacy "predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction," id., 537 A.2d at 1249, and that
surrogacy breeds the potential for exploitation of low-income women, id. at 439-40,
537 A.2d at 1249. Finally, the court concluded that Mrs. Whitehead's assent to the
terms of the contract was not dispositive, because "in a civilized society, [there are]
some things money cannot buy." Id. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249.
112 Id. at 441-42, 537 A.2d at 1250. The court observed:
The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared-the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she
is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money;
the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her isolation is felt
along with the full reality of the sale of her body and her child; the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother once they realize the
consequences of their conduct. Literature in related areas suggests
these are substantial considerations, although, given the newness of surrogacv, there is little information.
Id. at 441, 537 A.2d at 1250 (citations omitted).
I13 Id. at 442-44, 537 A.2d at 1250. The court relegated similar discussions by
other jurisdictions to a footnote. See id. at 442 n.1 1, 537 A.2d at 1250 n.1 I; supra
notes 55-78 and accompanying text (discussing surrogacy case law in Michigan,
Kentucky and New York). In the United Kingdom, only revocable surrogacy agreements arranged without brokers are legally permissible. Baby A1, 109 N.J. at 442
n.1 i,537 A.2d at 1251 n. 11.
114 Baby 11, 109 N.J. at 444-47, 537 A.2d at 1251-53.
115 Id. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252.
I 1I Id. "The trial court never found Mrs. Whitehead an unfit mother and indeed
affirmatively stated that Mary Beth Whitehead had been a good mother to her other
children." Id.
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The ChiefJustice noted that while a child's best interests are
determinative of custody, those interests are an insufficient basis
for termination of parental rights.' '7 Also, surrender of a child
coupled with consent to a private-placement adoption, the court
stated, does not mandate termination of a natural parent's
rights.' 8 While recognizing that statutory interpretation must
be flexible enough to accommodate individual circumstances,' 0the court held that nothing in the instant case justified termination of Mrs. Whitehead's rights. 120
The Baby M court also considered the constitutional ramifications of surrogacy.' -' 1 While acknowledging that the right to
procreate is a fundamental interest protected by the state and
federal constitutions, the court rejected the assertion that the
right extended to the nurturing, companionship, custody and
care following birth. '2 2 Stating that the right to procreate did not
extend beyond the act of conception, whether by artificial insemination or sexual intercourse, the court found no constitutional
basis to uphold Mrs. Stern's claim of custody."'2 The court further observed that an individual's right to privacy and self-determination must be tempered by the effect2 4those rights, if
exercised, will have on innocent third parties.
117 Id. (citing New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591,
603, 512 A.2d 438, 444 (1986); In reAdoption of Children by D, 61 N.J. 89, 97-98,
203 A.2d 171, 175-76 (1980)).
1 18 Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
I' Baby Ml, 109 N.J. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252. The natural parents' constitutional and statutory rights also must be considered. Id. (citing New Jersey Div. of
Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 512 A.2d 438 (1986)).
120 Id. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1253.
121 Id. at 447-52, 537 A.2d at 1253-55.
122 Id. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253. The court observed that while such rights "may
also be constitutionally protected. . . . Ithey] involve many considerations other
than the right of procreation." Id., 537 A.2d at 1253-54.
123 Id., 537 A.2d at 1254.
124 Id. at 449, 537 A.2d at 1254. The court referred to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Ilade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to support this conclusion. Baby Ml, 109 N.J. at 449 n.13, 537 A.2d at 1254 n.13. In Roe, the Court
held that while a woman's decision to have an abortion was protected by the right
to personal privacy, that right was not absolute and was subject to limitations inposed by a state's interests in protection of medical standards, health and prenatal
life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973). In Baby ,1, the New Jersey
Supreme Court analogized this balancing of individual and state interests with its
own decisions in cases involving termination of life-stpport svstems, and courtordered life-saving procedures, and determined that a similar baiancing of interests
was appropriate in the instant case. Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 449 n. 13, 537 A.2d at 1254
n.13. The court observed that "the parties' right to procreate by methods of their
own choosing cannot be enforced without consideration of the state's interest in
protecting the resulting child." Id.
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The court rejected Mrs. Stern's claim concerning deprivation of equal protection under the laws of New Jersey." 5 The
Sterns urged that just as New Jersey law grants full parental
rights to the infertile husband of a woman impregnated by a
sperm donor, a similar right should be recognized when the wife
is the infertile spouse.' 2" Reasoning that "a sperm donor simply
mother," the court summacannot be equated with a surrogate
2 7
rily rejected this argument.1
The court declined to decide the right-to-companionship
question raised by Mrs. Whitehead, declaring the issue moot in
light of its decision that her parental rights were improperly terminated. '2 ' The court warned in dicta, however, that future legislative measures to validate surrogacy agreements should
consider the fundamental right of a mother to the companionship of her child. 2 " A statute making the mother's consent revocable for a limited time following birth, the court opined, would
be more likely to pass constitutional muster than a statute which
made consent immediately irrevocable.' 3 0 The court further
observed that a voluntary and knowing surrender of a child could
significantly erode the strength of a parent's claim to companionship "to the point where a statute awarding custody and all parental rights to an adoptive couple, especially one that includes a
parent of the child, would be valid."''
As to custody, the court declared that while the claims of
both parents are given equal weight, the sole determining factor
would be the child's best interests. 13 2 It rejected the claim that,
Baby 11, 109 N.J. at 449-50, 537 A.2d at 1254-55.
Id. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp.
1987)).
127 Id. The court observed, however, that had Mrs. Whitehead contributed an
egg to be implanted in Mrs. Stern, an equal protection argument in relation to the
statute might have been implicated. Id., 537 A.2d 1254-55.
128 Id., 537 A.2d at 1255.
129 Id. at 452 n.16, 537 A.2d at 1255-56 n.16.
13 () Id.
125
126

131
132

Id.

Id. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256. The court posited:
With the surrogacy contract disposed of, the legal framework becomes a dispute between two couples over the custody of a child produced by the artificial insemination of one couple's wife by the other's
husband. Under the Parentage Act the claims of the natural father and
the natural mother are entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred
over the other solely because it is the father or the mother. The applicable rule given these circumstances is clear: the child's best interests determine custody.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West Supp. 1987)) (footnote omitted).
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regardless of Baby M's best interests, custody should be awarded
to the natural mother to discourage future surrogacy contracts."' The court also refused to disregard factors concerning
custody simply because they flowed from the original, and allegedly erroneous, ex parte award of custody to the Sterns. 's While
the court agreed that it was possible that the ex parte order may
have facilitated the development of facts affecting the outcome, it
asserted that an award of custody based on "some hypothetical
state of facts," rather than as the facts actually exist would be
3
improper. 1
The supreme court, relying on the testimony of eleven experts, "" contrasted the family lives, personalities and characters
of the parties.1 3 ' The court found that Baby M's "prospects for a
wholesome, independent psychological growth and development
133 Id. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1257. The court reasoned that holding the contract
unenforceable was adequate deterrence of future surrogacy agreements, and the
child's interests need not be sacrificed in order to further emphasize the point. Id.
at 454-55, 537 A.2d at 1257.
134 Id. at 455, 537 A.2d at 1257. See upra notes 31-39 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the ex parte order and the circumstances surrounding its entry.
In determining custody, the court considered the Sterns' continuing custody of
Baby M for more than one year. Baby 31, 109 N.J. at 455-56, 537 A.2d at 1257. It
also considered Mrs. Whitehead's erratic behavior as demonstrated by her flight to
Florida; "her willingness to use her children for her own aims" as shown by her
threats to murder Baby M and to falsely accuse Mr. Stern of sexually abusing her
oldest daughter; her manipulativeness as indicated by her threats of suicide; and
her unsettled family life as demonstrated by the innumerable moves from hotel to
hotel in Florida. Id.
The supreme court noted that while not relevant to the case at bar, ex parte
custody orders pendente lite should be entered in favor of the father, in cases where
the natural parents disagree as to custody at a child's birth, "only in an extreme,
truly rare, case." Id. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261. The court asserted that in any
future surrogacy disputes, the natural mother should retain custody pending litigation unless the father's ex parte application for custody pendente lite contains "proof
of unfitness, of danger to the child, or the like, of so high a quality and persuasiveness as to make it unlikely that" his application would fail. Id. at 462-63, 537 A.2d
at 1261. Absent the requisite showing, the matter should be listed for argument on
notice to the surrogate mother. Id. at 463, 537 A.2d at 1261.
1'3
Id. at 456, 537 A.2d at 1258. The Whiteheads argued "that had the trial court
not given initial custody to the Sterns during the litigation, Mrs. Whitehead not
only would have demonstrated her perfectly acceptable personality .. .but would
also have been able to prove better her parental skills along with an even stronger
bond than may now exist between her and Baby M." Id., 537 A.2d at 1257. While
noting that the argument had "considerable force" because the initial award of custody may have been erroneous and may have affected its present custody determination, the court ruled that it had to consider the child's actual best interests, "even
if some of the facts may have resulted in part from legal error." Id., 537 A.2d at
1257-58.
'.3
See Baby A1, 217 N.J. Super. at 355-69, 525 A.2d at 1148-56.
137 Baby M1, 109 N.J. at 457, 537 A.2d at 1258.
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would be at serious risk" if she was placed with the Whiteheads." ' The court questioned the stability of the Whitehead
family and finances,"' Mrs. Whitehead's domination of her two
older children, her contempt for professional counseling, and
her potential inability to explain to Baby M at the appropriate
time honestly and sensitively the circumstances surrounding her
origin. 4 " The ChiefJustice determined that the Sterns would be
stable, supportive and best suited to help Baby M come to terms
with her origin.' 4 ' Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's
award of custody to the Sterns.14 2
As to the issue of Mrs. Whitehead's visitation, the court declined to make a de novo determination because of the insufficiency of the record below. 14 It remanded the matter to the trial
1 44
court for a hearing and decision solely on this issue.
Finally, the supreme court asserted that unregulated, nontraditional methods of reproduction have the potential for causing great harm and suffering.' 4 5 While reiterating that New
Jersey laws do not allow the type of contract used in this case, the
138 Id. at 458, 537 A.2d at 1259. The court observed that while the Whiteheads
would love Baby M, her life would "be too closely controlled by Mrs. Whitehead."
Id.
139 The court reasoned that Mrs. Whitehead's pregnancy by another man, divorce, and subsequent remarriage, "suggests less stability in the Whiteheads'
lives." Id. at 461 n.18, 537 A.2d at 1260 n.18. While the court stated that these
new developments had not affected its decision, when the case was remanded on
the issue of visitation, the trial judge was ordered to consider these new circumstances. Id. at 461 n.18, 463 n. 19, 537 A.2d at 1260 n.18, 1261 n.19. See supra note
6 and accompanying text.
140 Baby 31, 109 N.J. at 457-58, 537 A.2d at 1258-59.
'41 Id. at 458-59, 537 A.2d at 1259.
142 Id. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259. While affirming the trial judge's decision, the
supreme court criticized him forjudging Mrs. Whitehead "rather harshly." Id. The
supreme court reasoned that her resistance to the ex parle order and her resulting
actions were understandable in light of her bond with the newborn infant. Id. The
supreme court also criticized the trial court's emphasis on the Whiteheads' and
Sterns' differing educational goals for Baby M, stating that while this was a legitimate consideration, "a best-interests test is designed to create not a new member
of the intelligentsia but rather a well-integrated person who might reasonably be
expected to be happy with life." Id. at 460, 537 A.2d at 1260.
143 Id. at 463, 537 A.2d at 1261.
144 Id. The court ordered that on remand the matter be heard by a trial judge
other than Judge Sorkow, the original trial judge, because of his potential commitment to his findings. Id. at 463 n.19, 537 A.2d at 1261 n.19 (quoting New Jersey
Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617, 512 A.2d 438, 452
(1986)). The court also observed that the guardian ad litem's suggested five-year
delay of Visitation was most unusual and possibly bordered on termination, but
could be ordered if the proof supported such a long-term postponement. Id. at
466-67, 537 A.2d at 1263.
"45 Id. at 468, 537 A.2d at 1264.
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court observed that voluntary surrogacy agreements, achieved
without compensation and providing the natural mother with an
opportunity for revocation, are not illegal.' 4" Noting that the
New Jersey Legislature may desire to undertake "the difficulties
of legislating on this subject,'' 147 the court observed that the implications of new reproductive technologies could be successfully
and objecaddressed only when "society decides what its values
'' 4
tives are in this troubling, yet promising, area. 1 8
The court's decision, even assuming it was appropriate for
the fact-specific Whitehead/Stern situation, offered little guidance or hope for the future of surrogate parenting. The court
showed minimal sensitivity, and arguably some hostility, toward
reproductive technology and those segments of society that
might take advantage of the solutions it offers. If there is to be
any future for alternative procreation techniques, prompt legislative intervention is essential.
In straining to implement its desired result, the court overstepped acceptable limits of legislative interpretation by the judiciary. A more enlightened approach would have been to admit
that current statutes neither contemplated nor addressed surrogacy. This was the approach taken by courts in New York ' 4 " and
Kentucky."" Both states refused to attribute prescience to their
respective legislatures' regulation of adoption. The Kentucky
court correctly recognized that "[i]f there are social and ethical
problems in the solutions science offers, these are problems of
public policy that belong in the legislative domain, not in the
146 Id.

at 468-69, 537 A.2d at 1264.

147 Id. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
148 Id. The court posited:

If the Legislature decides to address surrogacy, consideration of
this case will highlight many of its potential harms. We do not underestimate the difficulties of legislating on this subject. In addition to the
inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral issues involved,
there is the question of the wisdom and effectiveness of regulating a
matter so private, yet of such public interest. Legislative consideration
of surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the
overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnology-in vitro fertilization, preservation of sperm and eggs, embryo implantation and the
like. The problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the technology-especially for infertile couples-while minimizing the risk of abuse.
id.
149 In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.

Sur. 1986). See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
154) Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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judicial."' '5
It is difficult to understand how adoption laws enacted by the
New Jersey Legislature over thirty years ago could possibly be
stretched to cover the questions raised by modern reproductive
technology. 5 2 It is even more baffling how a surrogacy arrangement never addressed by the legislature could be "illegal and
perhaps criminal."' 153 That surrogacy opens up the proverbial
Pandora's box is undisputed. But as the lid has been raised, judicially wishing away the problem is not an appropriate solution.
The supreme court, concerned with the rights of surrogate
mothers, asserted that the contract was "potentially degrading to
women." 5 4 What is actually degrading is the court's implication
that there are some types of contracts that women are incapable
of understanding, negotiating or signing. Equally distressing is
the court's perpetuation of the stereotype that a woman's only
true talent is mothering and that the bond between her and the
l5
child is mystical to the point of defying reason.
The court is also mistaken when it equates surrogacy with
baby selling. 15" The laws which prohibit fees for adoption were
directed at black market adoptions, where the sale of children
occurred in an unsupervised environment with no protections for
the child. While the contract between the Sterns and the Whiteheads could have provided more safeguards for them and the
yet-to-be-conceived child, nothing in the transaction resembled
151 Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 213.
152 The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone in its hesitancy to embrace new
forms of reproduction. While artificial insemination has been used in this country
since 1884, Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous, and Other Legal Strangers: Deterininationi of Parentage and Artificial Inseniniatioi by Donor Under Ohio Lan', 45 OHIO ST.

L.J. 383, 385 n.25 (1984), courts in the United States and abroad as late as 1963
considered the act adulterous and the resultant child illegitimate. Lorio, Alternative
Aleais of Reproduction: Virgin TeritoTfor Legislatioi, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (1984);
Wadlington, Artificial Conceptioi: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465,

477-79 (1983).
15

Baby 11, 109 N.J. at 411, 422, 537 A.2d at 1234, 1240. See supra notes 86-87

and accompanying text.
14 Baby .A, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
'55 See id. at 453 n. 17, 537 A.2d at 1256 n. 17. While the court acknowledges that
the law provides for "equality in custody claims," it negates this concept in the
same paragraph by stating: "[his does not mean that a mother who has had custody of her child for three, four, or five months does not have a particularly strong
claim arising out of the unquestionable bond that exists at that point between the
child and its mother; in other words, equality does not mean that all of the considerations underlying the 'tender years' doctrine have been abolished." See id.
156 See id. at 437-39, 537 A.2d at 1248-49.
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the evil the legislature sought to combat by enacting adoption
statutes.
The most unsatisfying portion of the opinion dealt with the
federal constitutional issues. 15 7 And, indeed, this is the shoe still
waiting to drop. It is now almost a legal cliche that "[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.""' The Baby M
court held that "[t]he custody, care, companionship, and nurtur1
ing that follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation."''
This conclusion is debateable."
Somewhere within the right to
procreate and the right to choose not to have children,'"' must
necessarily lie the right to parent. Otherwise, the biological father truly has no rights and the female half of the union is, as a
matter of law, given supremacy. This flies in the face of equal
protection guarantees, and "there may be constitutional limits to
6
the state's power to restrict collaborative reproduction."1 2
Legislatures must rectify quickly the damage caused by this
decision, rather than be chilled into inaction."" While the New
157 See id. at 447-52, 537 A.2d at 1253-55. See also supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
151 Carey v.Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). See supra note I
and accompanying text.

159. Baby ., 109 N.J. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
'60 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 410 (1983). Robertson states that:

Childrearing is a rewarding and fulfilling experience, deserving respect
whether or not the person who rears also provided the genes or bore
the child. To deny someone who is capable of parenting the opportunity to rear a child is to deny him an experience that may be central to
his personal identity and his concept of a meaningful life. Although
childrearing is not, strictly speaking, reproduction, it is such an essential
part of the reproductive experience that freedom to enter or leave the
rearing role should be considered part of the freedom to procreate.
id.

16 1 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162 Robertson, Surogate .Mothers: .Vat So .Vovel.Ifter .411, 13 HASTINGS CENTER
28, 32 (1983). Robertson observes that:
It should follow that married persons also have a right to engage in
noncoital, collaborative reproduction, at least where natural reproduction is not possible. The right of a couple to raise a child should not
depend on their luck in the natural lottery, if they can obtain the missing
factor of reproduction from others.
If a married couple's right to procreative autonomy includes the
right to contract with consenting collaborators, then the state will have a
heavy burden of justification for infringing on that right.

REP.

Id.

1( Within a day of the court's decision, repercussions were apparent. Death was
predicted for a bi-partisan bill in the New York Legislature which would have legal-
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Jersey Supreme Court expressly stated that it failed to find any
statistics to support the Sterns and trial court's assertion that
"ten to fifteen percent of all couples are infertile,"'' 6 4 other research has been more fruitful. "An estimated fifteen to twenty
percent of American couples of childbearing age are infertile." 5
To slam the door on these couples (for whom adoption may not
be feasible or desirable), condemning them to a choice between
breaking the law or foregoing parenthood, is an untenable resolution of this dilemma.
In drafting legislation on surrogacy agreements, law makers
must be attuned to the unique problems and issues inherent in
surrogacy. While it is not the purpose of this note to propose
legislation, one flaw of surrogacy contracts, highlighted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, is deserving of mention - the contracting parents must be screened so that the child's best interests are truly protected."'
The legal system has decided the future of Melissa Elizabeth
Stern. Hopefully, it has not sealed the fate of hundreds of other
Melissas who, without legislative intervention, will remain unknown both to parents who long to hold them and society which
might benefit from their presence.
Donna M. duBeth
ized surrogate contracts. Before the Baby M decision, the bill was supported by
both the New York Assembly and Senate, and was "[e]yed as a model by legislators
across the country." Zeldis, Baby 1I Ruling Changes Picturefor V Surrogate-lother
Bill, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1988, at I, col. 1.
14 Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 452 n.16, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.16.
1 5 Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM.J. L. & MED. 243, 244 (citing Griffin, Wombfor Rent, 9 STUDENT LAW. 28, 29 (April 1981); Handel & Sherwyn,
Surrogate Parenting, 18 URIAL 57, 58 (1982)).
1 i'; Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

